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I discuss the nature of the economic reforms in China during the last quarter of a 
century in the context of a typology of economic systems, emphasizing the interaction 
between economic and social mechanisms. I also consider China’s options for further 
reforms. I focus on economic reforms that make the growth path less resource 
demanding and social reforms that enhance income security and improve education 
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* The paper is largely built on Lindbeck (2006b), which provides  richer references to data sources and 
the literature on the Chinese economy. I am grateful to Harry Flam and Solveig Wikström for useful 
comments on a draft of the paper.   2
 
In this paper I apply a systems-oriented, “holistic” approach to economic reforms in 
China during the last quarter of a century (approximately 1979-2006). The purpose 
is to analyze the nature of the reforms and the interaction between economic and 
social mechanisms during the reform period.  I also consider China’s options for 
further economic and social reforms, drawing heavily on relevant experiences over 
the years in developed countries. Since the focus is on long-term structural issues, 
short-term macroeconomic stabilization policy is de-emphasized. 
  
1. The Nature the Economic Reforms 
Since the economic reforms in China imply a change of economic system, it is 
useful to analyze them in the context of a typology of economic systems. To this 
end, I regard an economic system as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, defined in 
terms of a nine-dimensional vector; see Figure 1. The first two dimensions concern 
the ownership of firms and assets, respectively – contrasting public (government) 
and private ownership. The third dimension deals with the choice between 
centralized and decentralized economic decision-making, and the fourth with the 
related choice between administrative processes and market mechanisms for 
transmitting information, coordinating economic decisions, and distributing goods 
and services among households. The fifth and sixth dimensions concern the extent to 
which economic behavior is influenced by non-economic motives and economic 
incentives, respectively – in the case of individuals as well as firms. The seventh 
and eighth dimensions refer to a crucial aspect of the relation between economic 
agents in the domestic economy: the role of competition. The ninth dimension, 
finally, concerns the relations between domestic economic agents and the outside 
world, contrasting autarkic and internationally integrated (“internationalized”) 
economic systems.  
  
I depict the initial (“standardized”) position of China’s economic system in the late 
1970s by the vertical vector of circles to the far left in the figure. This was clearly a 
rather consistent system, combining collective ownership of firms and assets with 
administrative command of production in an economy that was basically cut off 
from international markets. Today’s position (2006) is depicted schematically by 
stars in the case of agriculture, and by squares for the rest of the economy.   3
Undoubtedly, the economic system has gradually shifted to the right in all 
dimensions – from public ownership towards private ownership of firms and assets, 
to more decentralized decision-making and more reliance on markets, economic 
incentives and competition, as well as from autarky to internationalization. It should 
be noted that the figure refers only to the economic system, not to the organization 
within the political system and the public sector. Before as well as during the reform 
period, the public sector has displayed a combination of a highly centralized 
political regime and pronounced administrative decentralization, in particular 
regionally.  
 
In the figure, I have schematically indicated the relative magnitude of the shifts in 
different dimensions of the economic system. Needless to say, the figure is only 
illustrative. (When I see no specific reason for asserting that a shift is larger in one 
dimension than in another, the shifts are simply depicted as having the same size in 
both.) In the case of agriculture, the most characteristic feature of today’s ownership 
structure is the combination of private ownership of firms and public ownership of 
the most important physical asset in the sector – the land that is leased by family 
farms from local authorities. In the figure, this feature of the ownership structure in 
agriculture is illustrated by a much larger shift to the right in the first dimension 
than in the second.  
 
Clearly, the move to private ownership of firms has been smaller in sectors other 
than agriculture: a number of large state-owned enterprises, SOEs, still play an 
important part in the case of public utilities, heavy industry and financial 
institutions, such as banks. However, the role of private firms has gradually 
increased also outside agriculture through the privatization of most small and 
medium-sized SOEs, the entry of private (including foreign-owned) firms, and the 
increasingly private features of so-called “collective” firms, mainly town-and-
village enterprises, TVEs. After the mid-1990s, many SOEs have also been 
considerably downsized. As a result of these developments, it is fair to say that the 
bulk of aggregate production (GDP) today takes place in the private sector.
1   
                                                 
1 OECD (2005, Table 2.1) estimates that about 60 percent of aggregate production in China in 2004 was 
accounted for by the private sector; Tseng and Zebregs (2002) present similar figures. The statistically recorded 
private share can be expected to rise after the revisions of the national accounts in the late 2005, reporting an   4
 
The partial and delayed privatization of firms and assets has not prevented huge and 
speedy reforms in other dimensions of the economic system. For instance, economic 
decision-making has largely been decentralized to households (in the case of 
consumption) and to firms (in the case of production) – schematically depicted in 
dimension 3 in Figure 1. Of course, an important prerequisite for this decentralization has 
been that markets have replaced administrative processes as the dominant mechanism for  
 
                                                                                                                                               
increase in the tertiary sector by about 9 percent of GDP. Indeed, in a speech to the yearly congress of the 
Chinese Economists Society, July 3, 2006, the Deputy Finance Minister of China, Jiwei Lou, stated that private 
firms account for 70 percent of aggregate output. Due to the large share of the population that still works in 
agriculture, the private share of the Chinese economy is larger in terms of employment than in terms of value 
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allocating resources and coordinating decision-making – illustrated in dimension 4 of the 
figure. This holds for industry and services as well as for agriculture. However, in several 
other dimensions, the reforms have progressed less in industry and capital-intensive 
services (such as electricity) because of frequent interventions in publicly owned firms by 
politicians and public-sector administrators. Indeed, this is the background for Gregory 
Chows’ characterization of China’s economy as a “bureaucratic market economy” (1997; 
2002, Chap. 19). 
 
Turning to the last dimension in Figure 1, the pronounced internationalization of the 
Chinese economy, in particular in manufacturing, is one of the most remarkable features 
of the reforms – in terms of foreign trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the import 
of technology.
2  The opening of the economy would also be expected to result in greater 
international cultural influences on Chinese citizens. One example is more individualistic 
(and perhaps also hedonistic) values, in particular among the urban young – a process that 
already seems to be underway. 
  
Two other characteristics of China’s economic system – not explicitly highlighted in 
Figure 1 – should also be emphasized. One is that factor markets have undergone less 
reform than product markets. For instance, the flexibility of the labor market is still 
constrained by various privileges of employees in state firms, which creates a pronounced 
insider-outsider situation in the urban labor market. Moreover, although the residence 
registration system in urban areas, the urban hukou, has recently become less restrictive, 
individuals without permanent residence permits – the “floating population” (often 
estimated at about 140 million) – are less rewarded in terms of earnings for their effort 
and investment in human capital than other inhabitants. (Maurer-Fazio and Dinh, 2002). 
These population groups, consisting mainly of migrants from agriculture, also enjoy less 
social protection (if any), and often have to pay substantially more than others for human 
services, such as health care and education for their children. Thus, the hukou system 
accentuates the insider-outsider feature of the urban labor market.  
   
                                                 
2 The export share has recently hovered around 30 percent of GDP (when measured by the official 
exchange rate). FDI has recently amounted to 4-5 percent of GDP – although much of this is probably 
accounted for by purchases of already existing real capital assets rather than by “greenfield investment”. 
These figures can be derived from official statistics on investment by non-mainland firms, assuming an 
aggregate investment ratio of 43 percent of GDP. (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2005, Table 6.1).    7
Financial markets are much less developed than labor markets. A basic explanation is that 
government institutions heavily dominate the markets for bonds, equities and bank 
lending, and that these institutions have systematically favored publicly owned firms at 
the expense of private firms. Typically, about two thirds of all bank credit seems to have 
been granted to the state sector over the last decade, often in the form of ”soft loans”, 
which in many cases have turned out to be non-performing in the sense that neither 
interest nor amortization has been paid.
3 The resulting distortions of the allocation of 
resources have been mitigated by the spontaneous emergence of informal markets for 
credit and capital. However, such a dual market system is in itself a distortion, reflected in 
the large differences in interest rates for loans with similar risks. 
  
Another characteristic feature of the economic system in China – not encompassed by 
Figure 1 – is the heavy reliance on informal networks of managers and entrepreneurs, 
partly as a substitute for a well functioning legal system. More specifically, economic 
relationships among economic agents are founded largely on social norms of cooperation, 
with roots in traditional kinship and community institutions (Wank, 1999). These norms 
are then based on a distinction between business insiders (neiren) and business outsiders 
(wairen). Indeed, such networks are often extended by close ties with local officials – ties 
that are crucial for entrepreneurs because legal rights are often enforced in a haphazard 
manner. 
 
Needless to say, such networks are not unproblematic. “Kickbacks” and other types of 
corruption are difficult to avoid in “clientele-like” relations between public-sector 
representatives and private entrepreneurs. Moreover, as emphasized by Zhang (2006), 
while such networks favor economic transactions among influential individuals, they may 
take place at the expense of weak groups of citizens. The most obvious example is 
perhaps the expropriation of land-tenure contracts held by farmers, when local politicians 
and administrators (“cadres”) turn over such contracts to developers in industry, retailing, 
and housing when land is rezoned. Although such interventions often speed up the 
reallocation of resources from agriculture to other sectors, this occurs at the expense of 
                                                 
3 The share of non-performing loans has been reduced considerably in recent years (perhaps from above 30 to 
less than 10 percent), mainly through injections of new capital to the banks from the Government, and a shift of 
bad loans to special asset management corporations. Of course, these are only temporary solutions as long as 
the  quality of bank lending and asset management in general is not improved considerably.  See, for instance, 
Lardy (2000), Goldstein and Lardy (2004) and Dobson (2006).   8
farmers’ economic security. For instance, at least 34 million farmers seem to have lost 
their land-lease contracts (partly or completely) between 1987 and 1991 due to 
expropriation (UNDP, 2005, footnote 120). Social concerns are relinquished for other 
purposes, such as a fast rate of structural change or, indeed, the enrichment of local 
cadres, who often receive a share of the capital gains from such reallocation of land-lease 
contracts.  
 
 Although corruption usually tends to reduce the efficiency of the allocation of resources 
in a national economy, it may very well have speeded up the transition to private 
entrepreneurship in China. The reason is that kickbacks to local politicians and public-
sector administrators, as well as “asset stripping” associated with management buyouts in 
SOEs, have contributed to the emergence of a class of private capitalists. Still, in a long-
term perspective, after the “transition period”, it is likely that a system based on the “rule 
of law” will be more efficient than network relations that function as substitutes for the 
rule of law, and with large elements of corruption (Svensson, 2005, and references 
therein). 
 
There is no lack of recent official commitments by the Chinese authorities to fight 
corruption. But as long as public-sector politicians and public-sector administrators have 
something to “sell”, such as various types of permits and other favors, corruption is 
difficult to avoid. This is an additional argument for further deregulation of the Chinese 
economy – on top of conventional arguments in favor of improved economic efficiency. 
International experiences and research also suggest that a free press helps contain 
corruption (Svensson, 2005).   
 
How, then, should the economic system in China be labeled? Some observers have called 
it “state capitalism”. While this label may have been appropriate in the 1980s, it is rather 
misleading today. The bulk of production, output growth, employment expansion and 
probably also technological change now takes place in privately owned firms, including 
firms controlled by foreign (non-mainland) owners via the import of technology. The term 
market socialism, although often used by the Chinese authorities, is also misleading since 
dominating models of market socialism – such as those developed by Oskar Lange (1938) 
and Abba Lerner (1934) – presuppose public ownership of firms and, in the case of 
Lange, also government-determined prices. Considering the nature of the economic   9
reforms, the Chinese economic system is probably most appropriately characterized as a 
special type of “mixed economy” – with less private ownership of assets than of firms, 
frequent political and bureaucratic interventions in public-sector firms, poorly developed 
factor markets (in particular the financial markets), and business networks that partly 
replace “the rule of law”. In spite of various limitations of the economic reforms, the 
emergence of a labor market and the establishment of product markets with equilibrating 
prices (hence without physical rationing) have enhanced  the economic freedom of 
individuals considerably. I refer mainly to individuals’ freedom to choose their employer, 
workplace and consumption bundle – as well as to set up a business and become an 
entrepreneur. 
 
2. Economic Performance 
We do not really know which specific features of China’s economic reforms during the 
last quarter of a century best explain the county’s successful growth performance – 
officially recorded as a yearly GDP growth rate of 9.5 percent over the last 27 years.
4 We 
can only say that the actual combination of features of the country’s economic system, 
schematically illustrated in Figure 1, has been conducive to fast GDP growth. It is also 
rather generally agreed among observers that the gradual and experimental approach to 
the economic reforms – across production sectors, regions and reform areas – has served 
China well. In particular, gradualism probably helps explain why China experienced a 
much better synchronization of job destruction and job creation during the transition 
period than the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. We cannot be sure, 
however, that gradualism (as compared to a big-bang strategy) will succeed equally well 
in the future. First, successful reforms of factor markets often require a large number of 
complementary policy measures, including the build-up of market-supporting institutions 
of various types, such as in the legal and financial systems. Second, there is always a risk 
that a gradualist reform process will come to a halt, since gradualism gives various 
interest groups time to build up resistance to further reforms (“veto points”). By way of 
comparison, recent attempts in Western Europe to gradually deregulate services and factor 
markets, and to reform various welfare-state arrangements, have encountered such 
problems. Although the mechanisms of resistance to reforms differ between non-
                                                 
4 Unless indicated otherwise, I have relied on official Chinese statistics in this paper. Although these 
statistics may be unreliable in many respects, so are many of the alternative calculations by individual   10
democratic and democratic societies, “veto points” certainly exist in the former as well. It 
is also difficult to predict how a future democratization of China would affect the 
aggregate growth rate. The main result of research on the relation between forms of 
government and economic growth seems to be that the variance of growth rates is smaller 
among democracies than among non-democratic countries. 
 
When evaluating China’s economic success in recent decades, it does not suffice to look 
solely at the GDP growth rate. It is also important to take into account the resource costs 
of the chosen growth strategy – i.e., the efficiency of the growth path. Clearly, China has 
followed a highly resource-demanding, i.e., “extensive”, growth path. I refer to the 
exceptionally high investment ratio for real assets as compared to human capital (43 
versus 4 percent of GDP), the high input of energy and raw materials per unit of output,
5 
and the notorious environmental damage. Overstaffing and excessive inventories of 
finished and intermediary products in the SOEs during most of the reform period might be 
regarded as further signs of inefficiency in the Chinese economy, although these features 
have mitigated the rise in unemployment during transition.  
 
In principle, this indirect evidence of inefficiencies in the Chinese growth path 
should also be reflected in estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the 
country – although calculations of this variable are probably even more hazardous 
in China than in developed countries.
6 At first glance, TFP growth looks reasonably 
good during the reform period – it is often estimated in the interval of 3-4 percent 
per year. However, these figures partly reflect reallocation gains across sectors 
(basically shifts of labor from agriculture to other sectors) and improvement in 
human capital through education and training, rather than better technology and 
organization in individual firms. To get a grip on the latter factors (technology and 
organization), we may want to exclude the former (reallocation gains and improved 
human capital) from the calculations, hence confining the analysis to what is often 
called “multifactor productivity” (MFP) growth. We then obtain figures in the 
                                                                                                                                               
observers and organizations. The uncertainty regarding official statistics should, however, be kept in 
mind. 
5 For example, China’s energy consumption per unit of aggregate output seems to be more than double the 
world average (IIE, 2006, p. 34), although this kind of waste is lower today then a decade ago. 
 
6 Indeed, Holz (2005, section 4a) argues that there is no stable aggregate production function for China 
for the reform period.   11
interval of 1.5 to 2.5 percent during the reform period as a whole.
7 Moreover, it 
should be noted that figures on both TFP and MFP growth during the reform period 
as a whole partly reflect temporary spurts in productivity growth in connection with 
two special productivity-enhancing reforms: the shift from collective to family 
farms in the early 1980s and the comprehensive price reform in the early 1990s – 
both typical “transition phenomena”. Moreover, much of the introduction of new 
technology and organization has taken place in foreign (non-mainland) firms rather 
than domestic firms.
8 On balance, productivity changes through better technology 
and organization within domestic firms may not have been so impressive. 
 
The huge differences in economic development across geographical areas within China is 
another well-known feature of the growth process in the country – with the eastern 
(coastal) provinces as the leaders, and the mountainous provinces in the west, along with 
the “rustbelt” areas in the north, as the laggars.
9 In fact, the regional differences in the 
level of per capita GDP among China’s provinces (and large cities) today are so striking 
that China looks like a continent with a mixture of a number of middle-income industrial 
countries and some of the poorest countries in the world.
10 
 
One explanation for these regional differences is, of course, that the shift from a closed to 
an open economy increased the comparative advantage of the coastal areas. These 
regional income differences were accentuated by the fact that the opening took place in a 
selective manner via “Special Economic Zones” (SEZs), characterized by deregulations 
and special tax breaks. The improved competitive position of these areas was further 
strengthened by a concentration of infrastructure investment to these regions. Thus, the 
                                                 
7 For surveys of studies of TFP and/or MFP growth, see, for instance, Heytens and Zebregs (2003),  
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005), OECD (2005); and Wu (2006). 
8 See, for instance, Tseng and Zebregs (2002) and OECD (2002, pp. 195-230). Whalley and Xin (2006). 
estimate that foreign firms contributed about 40 percent to China’s GDP growth in 2003 and 2004. 
9  Official statistics suggest that while GDP has grown by about 11.5 percent per year during the reform period 
in the most successful provinces (Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang), the growth rate has been about 
half that size in the least successful province (Quinghai). Today’s level of per capita GDP is reported to be 
about seven times higher in the most developed than in the least developed province, even if we exclude the 
very poorest province (Guizhou).     
10 The income gap between urban and rural areas has also increased since the mid-1980s, although this does not 
seem to be the case if we instead use 1978 as the starting point for the comparison (and taking differences in 
cost of living into account. (Ravallion and Chen, 2006.) According to official statistics, average income in 
urban areas is 3.3 times higher than in rural areas.    12
regional income differences today are closely related to China’s choice of strategy for 
rapid economic growth during the reform period. 
 
3. Social Problems 
The sixfold increase in per capita income and the related dramatic fall in the incidence of 
so-called “absolute poverty” are the most obvious social achievements in China during the 
reform period.
11 However, it is not difficult to identify a number of remaining, and in 
some cases increasing, social problems. As a background to the subsequent discussion of 
China’s options concerning future social arrangements, I will emphasize three such 
problems. 
 
First, according to the World Bank (2003, 2004), the Gini coefficient has increased 
from 28 in 1981 to 43 in 2001 – a figure not much below the Gini coefficient in some 
of the least egalitarian countries in the world, such as Brazil and Mexico. From a social 
point of view, the most important aspect of this development is probably the increase 
in relative poverty in China. Today, while the poorest 10 percent of households seem 
to earn about 2 percent of aggregate disposable household income, the richest 10 
percent earn about 35 percent (World Development Indicators, 2006). This 
development has been a result not only of the uneven path of average income across 
provinces and between urban and rural areas (the latter probably only since the mid-
1980s
12). It is also a result of the increased dispersion of income within such areas 
(UNDP, 2005). One important factor behind the latter development is simply the shift 
to an incentive-based economic system, reflected in a huge increase in the skill 
premium (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2005). Naturally, in the new more incentive-based 
economic system, some individuals have been more successful than others in 
improving their economic situation. 
  
Second, it is not surprising that previous social arrangements largely broke down during 
the process of economic reform. Even to a larger extent than in the Soviet Union and the 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the responsibility for social arrangements in China 
during the pre-reform period was delegated to work units (danwei), while government 
                                                 
11 If absolute poverty is defined as an income of less than (about) one dollar a day, the incidence fell from about 
50 percent to less than 10 percent of the Chinese population between 1981 and 2002 (World Bank, 2003). 
12 See Ravallion and Chen (2006).   13
authorities were responsible for major production and investment decisions (a rough type 
of input-output planning). In other words, in addition to serving as executors of centrally 
assigned production and investment tasks, work units functioned as mini-welfare states. In 
a typical Chinese formulation, they were “enterprises running small societies” (Xiaoyi, 
1996). With only slight exaggeration we could say that the division of tasks between the 
government and the work units in China during the pre-reform period was more or less 
the reverse of the corresponding division in developed countries today, where firms are in 
charge of production and investment, and the government (particularly in Western 
Europe) runs most of the social arrangements.  
 
However, before the economic reforms, the budgets of individual SOEs were to a 
considerable extent integrated with the government budget: the surpluses (profits) of 
individual firms were delivered to the central government budget, and the government 
covered their losses. Some of the social costs borne by individual SOEs were therefore 
pooled across the nation as a whole. Thus, the financing of the social arrangements in 
urban areas formally resembled high (close to 100 percent) profit taxes with “fully offset 
loss”. However, wages were kept down to generate sufficiently high profits to finance 
these social benefits. It may therefore be more appropriate to say that the financing of 
social spending in urban areas, in fact, was largely equivalent to payroll taxes with the 
incidence on wage earners.
13 
 
It is easy to understand why the economic reforms rendered the pre-reform social 
arrangements dysfunctional. The new competitive environment meant that many firms 
could no longer afford to live up to their social obligations – such as job guarantees, 
pensions and various types of human services, including health care, recreation facilities 
and the education of employees’ children. Moreover, benefits tied to specific work units 
do not sit well in a market economy, since an efficiently functioning labor market requires 
social benefits to be portable.  
 
Ad hoc selective subsidies, capital transfers from the government and soft loans from state 
banks functioned as “stop-gap solutions” to make it easier for firms live up to their social 
obligations. As a result, bank loans to private firms were further constrained, which   14
accentuated the discrimination of such firms in financial markets. This, in turn, further 
reduced the ability of such firms to expand production and employment. The “double 
bind” – state firms constrained in shedding labor and private firms constrained in 
acquiring loans – has implied a kind of catch-22 situation during much of the reform 
period. It will be difficult to remove this “double bind” until non-state firms are able to 
expand their employment sufficiently to absorb a large fraction of the redundant labor 
force in state firms, and before a comprehensive system of income security is in place. 
 
Inadvertently, households have also helped finance firms’ social obligations during the 
reform period, since households’ deposits in state banks (at low, and during some periods 
even negative, real interest rates) have been intermediated into low-interest loans to state 
firms. As a result, the social obligations of state firms have, in fact, been partly financed 
by an “inflation tax” on households’ financial saving (although less so during years with 
low inflation). This, in turn, implies that much of the real return on household saving has 
been transferred to the beneficiaries of various social arrangements – much like a tax-
financed pay-as-you-go system, although in this case the “tax” was imposed on the return 
on saving rather than on work. 
 
Moreover, since the government has only partially and quite slowly taken over the 
financing of “human services”, such as education and health care, it has been necessary to 
finance such services from other sources. For instance, the funding of education from 
sources other than government budgets seems to have been as high as 43 percent in recent 
years; see, for instance, Chow (2006a). Indeed, a considerable share has taken the form of 
out-of-pocket money (13 percentage points in recent decades according to Zhang and 
Kanbur (2005). In the case of health care, the share of non-government expenditures 
seems to have become as high as 60 percent (in 2001) – largely through insurance among 
urban insiders and out-of-pocket money for the rural population.   
 
Third, structural changes create new problems. One example is the increase in 
market risks inherent in any shift to a market-based economic system. Another is 
                                                                                                                                               
13 Before the economic reforms, the social costs of firms seem to have been about the same size as the 
wage bill; see Hussain, 2000, p. 70.   15
the expected demographic development.
14 So far, lower fertility has diminished the 
“demographic burden” for the active generation – a so-called “demographic 
dividend”. However, within a few years, this dividend will be turned into a rising 
“demographic deficit” when the ratio between individuals of working age and the 
size of the rest of the population falls drastically. Indeed, reasonable forecasts for 
the next few decades suggest that the number of individuals of working age will be 
about the same as the number of “dependents” (the sum of children below 18 and 
elderly above 60).
15   
 
Since China is “getting old before getting rich”
16, these problems will emerge at a 
lower per capita income level in China than in today’s developed and middle-
income countries. As a caricature of the demographic development, observers talk 
about the “4-2-1 problem”: a situation where one child may be required to support 
and care for two aged parents and four grandparents. The caricature is, of course, 
only intended to illustrate the likelihood of either a heavy burden for individuals of 
working age, or serious unsatisfied needs among elderly citizens – or, most likely, a 
combination of both. The aging of the population will probably also impede the 
long-term vitality of the economy, since innovation and new entrepreneurship often 
emerge among young cohorts. The demographic development could also be 
expected to reduce the household saving rate – a prediction that follows 
immediately from the life-cycle saving theory. 
 
Recent suggestions to soften the “one-child policy” are probably partly a response 
to these future demographic threats, although they may also be a reaction to the 
distorted proportion between newborn boys and girls (1.18 instead of the more 
normal figure of around 1.03). However, it is unlikely that removal of the one-child 
policy can ameliorate the demographic situation to any considerable extent. There is 
a rather universal (country-independent) relation between modernization on one 
                                                 
14 Broadly speaking, the fertility rate has dropped from about 6.0 immediately after World War II to 
about 1.5 today, and life expectancy (at birth) has increased during the same period from about 35 to 
about 72 years. 
15 The UNDP (2005) predicts that the population share of individuals of working age will start to fall 
after 2010 and be as low as 53 percent by 2050 – the lowest predicted share at that time among East 
Asian countries except Japan. The share of the population aged 60 years and above is predicted (by UN, 
2003) to be about 30 percent by 2050.  
16 Quotation from the title of article by Tian (2004).   16
hand, and falling fertility and rising life expectancy on the other. Experiences from 
many countries also suggest that it is not easy, although not impossible, for 
governments to boost fertility after it has declined substantially.
 17  
 
The urbanization process is another important structural factor that affects social 
arrangements. In principle, it is administratively easier to build up systems of income 
insurance for employees in urban areas than for the farm population, simply because 
concepts such as income and unemployment are easier to define for employees in industry 
and services than in agriculture. Moreover, the reallocation gains from urbanization 
expand the aggregate tax base, and this helps finance both income insurance and human 
services. In both respects, urbanization facilitates the build-up of mandatory systems of 
income insurance. 
 
Urbanization is, of course, also accompanied by detrimental social consequences. 
Problems related to congestion are perhaps the most obvious example. Without 
intervention against motor vehicles in cities, for example through congestion fees, the 
traffic system is bound to create inefficiencies in the transportation system and harm the 
quality of city life due pollution, crowding and noise. Indeed, this has already happened in 
many places in China, but the worst is yet to come. Since the required policy interventions 
are politically easier when car owners are still a small minority, the Chinese authorities 
have a political “window of opportunity” in the near future to deal with these problems.  
 
City life is, of course, accompanied by other social problems, such as criminality, the 
misuse of drugs and alcohol, and mental disorders – not least in large cities. General 
social policies – like income insurance and human services such as education and health 
care – have turned out not to be sufficient to solve these problems. Experience suggests 
that highly selective (targeted) social interventions (“rehabilitation”) among specific 
groups of citizens are also urgent. Perhaps China could mitigate some of the problems 
related to urbanization by promoting the growth of small and medium-sized cities as 
alternatives to ever-larger mega-cities (with 10 to 50 million people). “Medium size” in 
                                                 
17 Although the drastic fall in fertility in China has probably been speeded up by the official one-child 
policy, the time path of the fertility rate in China does not differ drastically from the situation in other 
East Asian countries during comparable periods of ”modernization” (UNPD, 2005).   17
this case might then be interpreted as cities with between half a million and one or two 
million people.  
  
All these social problems – the widening of the distribution of income (in particular, the 
increase in relative poverty), the breakdown of previous social arrangements, and new 
social problems due to various socio-economic changes – have recently attracted more 
attention both within China and among foreign observers.  Against this background, it is 
of interest to look at alternative options in future social policies in China – an issue to 
which I now turn. 
 
4. Options for new social arrangements 
 It is hardly surprising that new arrangements for income security and human services did 
not emerge spontaneously through market forces as the old arrangements began to break 
down in connection with the economic reforms. Indeed, this experience is consistent with 
traditional economic theory, which highlights a number of limitations in voluntary 
markets for both income insurance and the provision of human services, such as education 
and health care (Barr, 2004). It is also well known that the Chinese authorities have been 
slow in building up new social arrangements, except mainly for urban insiders. It is useful 
to classify the task of building up such arrangements into three categories: (i) 
interventions designed to boost the level and stability of  factor income (income before 
taxes and transfer payments), in particular among low-income groups; (ii) tax/transfer 
arrangements that stabilize and redistribute disposable income for given factor incomes 
(”income insurance”); and (iii) improved and more evenly distributed provision of various 
types of human services. 
 
Factor-income policies 
Naturally, since China is still a poor country, there is a strong social case for a 
continuation of rapid factor-income growth for the population as a whole, and hence rapid 
GDP growth.
18 China also has much to gain by gradually shifting from an extensive to a 
more intensive growth path – with more emphasis on human relative to physical capital, a 
more efficient allocation of resources, and faster introduction of new technology and 
organization. It may then be possible to increase the GDP share of both ordinary private   18
consumption (today only about 40 percent of GDP) and consumption of human services 
without much, if any, fall in the GDP growth rate. Less capital-intensive production, 
including an increased role of labor-intensive services, would also be important to limit 
unemployment in the future.  
 
Most likely, better functioning factor markets would facilitate such a change in the 
character of the growth path. Better working conditions for private entrepreneurship 
would also be beneficial in this respect. One indicator is that private firms seem to be 
more efficient than comparable publicly owned firms in China.
19  Experience from 
developed countries also indicates that private entrepreneurship is highly conducive to 
innovations; see, for instance, Baumol (2000). Moreover, at least a partial privatization of 
the banking system would be expected to reduce the bias of lending in favor of state 
enterprises, and hence remove an important obstacle to expansion of the private sector.  
 
There is also a strong case for implementing highly targeted policies to boost factor 
income in poor regions and among low-productivity individuals regardless of where they 
live. Indeed, empirical studies in China indicate that targeted infrastructure investment in 
poor areas (including investment that increases market access) tends to raise productivity 
considerably among both family farms and other firms.
 There is also evidence of 
productivity improvements as a result of better nutrition, sanitation, basic health services 
and education in geographical areas with a large incidence of impoverished citizens.
20  
 
Removal (or at least further softening) of the urban hukou would also be expected to boost 
per capita factor income, both among those who move to urban areas and among those 
who remain in the countryside (as a result of increased remittances and diminished labor 
supply in rural areas).
21 In principle, it would also be possible to spread the income gains 
through tax-transfer programs. The most obvious losers would be urban insiders who 
                                                                                                                                               
18 According to World Bank (2003) calculations, about 40 percent of the population still seems to live on 
less than $2 a day.  
19 See, for instance, empirical studies that compare SOEs and private firms by Anming et al. (2003), Xu 
et al. (2005) and McKinsey Global Institute (2006). 
20 For instance, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) find that investment in both infrastructure and human capital has 
significantly raised the return to farmers’ investment in physical assets (other factors held constant).  
21 On the basis of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, Whalley and Zhang (2004) find non-
trivial redistibutional effects of this type as a result of an assumed  removal of the hukou.   19
would be exposed to more wage competition; this would, however, contribute to reducing 
overall income inequality in the country as a whole.  
 
Indeed, such developments would extend the period of Arthur Lewis-type “unlimited 
supply of labor” in urban areas. During a comparable phase of industrialization, today’s 
developed countries in Europe also experienced a huge outflow of labor from agriculture. 
But a considerable share of the rural population could then migrate to other continents 
with ample availability of agricultural land and subsequently expanding urban labor 
markets. China’s current agricultural population does not have the same opportunities.   
 
The future development of the distribution of factor income in China is also related to 
what happens to the ownership of agricultural land. In a similar way as the shift from 
collective farms to family farms in the early 1980s stimulated productivity in agriculture, 
a shift to private ownership of agricultural land is likely to have the same result. Farmers 
be encouraged to make long-term investments in the land that they cultivate, and it would 
be easier to consolidate fragmented patches of land, with better exploitation of returns to 
scale. The would be particularly useful, for instance, in the case of wheat, vegetables and 
animal products.
22. A shift to outright ownership of land would also be likely to 
strengthen farmers’ property rights, thereby improving investment incentives.  
 
There thus seems to be a conflict between lingering socialist ideology with respect to land 
ownership and concern about both long-term efficiency and higher per capita factor 
income in agriculture. Deng Xiaoping is famous for the metaphor that the color of the cat 
does not matter as long as it can catch mice. But in regard to the ownership of land, the 
“color” of the land still matters. “Political economy” mechanisms may also help explain 
the resistance among powerful interest groups to the privatization of land: local politicians 
and public-sector administrators have a strong vested interest in government ownership of 
land – in terms of power as well as financial gains (corruption in many cases).
23 
                                                 
22 Improvements in the transferability of land-lease contracts would facilitate such consolidation. Indeed, Wan 
and Cheng (2001, p.191) estimate that consolidation of fragmented patches of land would increase labor 
productivity by as much as 12-17 percent, depending of the types of crops.  
23 There may also be more pragmatic considerations behind the reluctance of the Chinese authorities to 
privatize agricultural land. One might be that the distribution of wealth could gradually become more uneven 
within the agricultural population (since some farmers will be more able than others to consolidate land 
holdings) – although the distribution of income and wealth among the Chinese population as a whole could 
very well become more even. Another consideration might be that an ensuing consolidation of land holdings   20
 
Could price regulations be another useful device for redistributing factor income across 
social groups? There is no doubt that the income of tenants could be augmented at the 
expense of landlords, at least temporarily, by rent control that keeps rents below market 
equilibrium. However, the disadvantages of such policies are also well known from 
experience in developed countries; excess demand for housing (“housing shortages”), 
black markets for rental contracts, deterioration in the quality of the housing stock, and a 
fall in new construction (which has often induced governments to start subsidizing 
housing construction). The distributional consequences among tenants are also rather 
dubious, since personal contacts with landlords and transactions on black markets tend to 
favor high-income groups in markets with a permanent housing shortage as the result of 
rent control. 
 
Agricultural price regulations have also been used extensively in many countries to 
redistribute and stabilize factor income. While developing countries have often 
implemented such regulation to keep down the prices of agricultural products, primarily 
to favor urban consumers at the expense of farmers, most developed countries have done 
just the opposite. There is no doubt that such policies have boosted revenues for the 
agricultural population, at least initially. But there are serious problems inherent in such 
policies. For instance, inefficient farms will survive more easily, thereby retarding the 
consolidation of land holdings and hence rationalization in the agricultural sector. There 
are also well-known distributional problems associated with agricultural protectionism. 
Owners of large farms tend to be favored as compared to owners of small ones, since the 
latter themselves consume a considerable fraction of the output from their farms. 
Moreover, low-income consumers are harmed relative to other consumers since they use a 
larger sharer of their income to buy agriculture products. Thus, schematically speaking, 
there would b e a redistribution of income from poor consumers to relatively affluent 
farmers. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
could reduce the possibilities for migrants to urban areas to return to agriculture, after having failed in the 
cities: there would simply be fewer family farms to receive them. This disadvantage would, however, be 
mitigated by the fact that private ownership of land would enable elderly farmers to transform their land into 
cash and, in turn, provide financial assistance to  family members who did not “make it” in the cities.  
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Hence, if the authorities want to boost the factor income of low-income groups, policies 
that improve their productivity are much more promising than price regulations. Not only 
do such policies increase rather than reduce economic efficiency, they are also better 
targeted. 
 
Needless to say, both the level and the stability of factor income are vital from a social 
point of view. This holds, in particular, for the poorest segments of the population, since 
their margins in terms of misery are especially narrow. Policies that smooth 
macroeconomic fluctuations may therefore be regarded as a first line of defense against 
income instability.
24 In so far as stabilization policies have been pursued at all in China 
during the last decades, they mainly seem to have taken the form of direct quantitative 
regulations of investment and credit flows rather than general fiscal and monetary policy 
incentives. One reason is probably that public-sector firms have been regarded as quite 
insensitive to economic incentives. However, as the economic system gradually becomes 
more incentive-oriented, stabilization policy can rely increasingly on such incentives. 
 
Tax/transfer arrangements 
What, then, are the basic policy options in the case of tax/transfer arrangements? One 
issue concerns the choice between (fairly) generous income-insurance arrangements for a 
narrow group of individuals and less generous arrangements for the population as a 
whole. So far, the Chinese authorities have chosen the former alternative. Indeed, new 
arrangements of mandatory income insurance usually cover no more than 110-180 million 
employees – mainly “urban insiders”. Moreover, per capita transfers to households seem 
to be about 10 times as large in urban as in rural areas (UNDP, 2005, p. 3). 
 
So what would a strategy with broader coverage of tax/transfer arrangements look like? 
From an administrative point of view, unemployment insurance and pensions (the two 
major systems of income insurance) could certainly be extended to basically all 
employees in industry and services – in urban as well as rural areas. Of course, it is more 
difficult to organize similar systems of income insurance in agriculture; indeed, concepts 
such as unemployment and retirement are difficult to apply in this sector. However, 
                                                 
24 On the basis of a dynamic simulation model of the Chinese macroeconomy, Zhang (2001) reports that 
temporary external shocks tend to reduce the growth path of the economy for a considerable period of 
time (several years). Of course, this is not unique for China.   22
improved crop-failure legislation and/or improved natural-disaster relief may to some 
extent fulfill similar functions. In the case of pensions, some kind of basic, lump-sum 
benefit would also be administratively feasible for the population as whole.  
 
However, there are also a number of country-specific problems to be found in China’s 
emerging systems of income insurance. One example is that risk pooling often takes place 
only across limited geographical areas, such as a city, or possibly a province. At first 
glance, this may seem to be a trivial problem, since the geographical domains of risk 
pooling are often more populous than many European nations. However, the composition 
of industries often differs strongly across geographical areas, so that the payroll taxes, 
designed to finance the benefits, vary strongly across such areas. In particular, firms in 
areas with many unemployed or pensioners are exposed to much higher social costs than 
firms in other areas. For instance, payroll taxes are relatively high in regions with old 
industries, such as mining and steel, whereas they are relatively low in regions with new 
industries, such as banking, electronics and civil aviation. This tends to influence the 
relative competitiveness of firms in a rather arbitrary way, especially if local wages do not 
adjust fully to the differences in the payroll taxes. The limited area of risk pooling also 
reduces the portability of benefits, which impedes the emergence of a national labor 
market. Generally speaking, de facto fragmentation of the social arrangements across the 
country has created problems for both the competiveness of firms in different regions of 
the country and the mobility of labor. 
 
Like several other countries, China has in recent years experimented with a combination 
of pay-as-you-go (“paygo” for short) and funded pension systems, thus far mainly 
covering urban citizens. However, both types of arrangements are likely to be confronted 
with financial problems in the future. Since the main problem in the paygo part of the 
pension system is related to the “graying” of the population, this specific problem could in 
principle be mitigated by a gradual increase in the effective retirement age. (The formal 
pension age today is 60 years for males and 55 for females, with an effective retirement 
age of only 55 for the former). If this would not suffice, what remains are a shift less 
generous benefits and/or higher contributions (although total payroll taxes are already 
quite high, about 40 percent).  
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A more specific problem for China is that contributions originally paid into the funded 
part of the pension system have, in fact, been used to finance deficits in the paygo part of 
the system – the problem of “empty individual accounts”. As a consequence, the funded 
part of the mandatory pension system, so far, looks like merely another paygo system 
with “notional” (book-keeping) rather than real accounts. The Chinese authorities could 
basically choose between two alternative strategies to deal with this issue. One would be 
to abandon the idea of funded individual accounts altogether and be content with the 
paygo part of the system. The other alternative would be to “recapitalize” the accounts. 
One possibility would then be tax-financed capital injections into the accounts. Another 
possibility, suggested by Pieter Bottelier (2002), would be to let the National Social 
Security Fund take over the shares in a number of state firms. The fund could then be 
instructed to sell the shares gradually on the open market, at appropriate intervals to avoid 
strong negative effects on share prices. The revenues from the sales could then be used to 
recapitalize the empty individual accounts. In this way, two birds would be killed with 
one stone: a restoration of the individual accounts and a speed-up of the privatization of 
government-owned corporations. A more modest version of this idea has, in fact, already 
been implemented. The collective fund in China is entitled to receive 10 percent of the 
proceeds from sales of shares in state-owned companies every time there is an initial 
public offering (IPO), or new share issue. 
 
A more general problem with funded government-run pension systems is whether the 
government should opt for government-operated or privately-operated funds. The latter 
alternative is, of course, more consistent with the notion of a decentralized and 
competitive market economy. Government-operated funds always run the risk of being 
“high-jacked” by politicians who insist that they should decide the portfolio policy of the 
funds, appoint the members of the board of the fund(s), appoint board members in firms 
where the funds have bought shares, and perhaps also give direct instructions about the 
allocation of the portfolios of the funds.  
 
The most promising way of significantly reducing the probability of such political 
intervention in government-created pension funds, and hence de facto nationalization of 
the national economy, is to opt for a number of decentralized, non-government funds from 
the very beginning. Considering China’s recent tradition of government ownership and 
political intervention in individual firms, the risk (or “hope” among some observers) that   24
a funded, government-created pension system will, in fact, result in a strongly 
nationalized economy is hardly less in China than in other countries. 
 
Human services 
As in the case of income insurance, the provision of human services in China, including 
education and health, have lagged as compared to the successful GDP growth during the 
reform period. In the case of education, the basic problem is not that the services are 
currently provided by several different types of agents: organizations affiliated with 
SOEs, local governments and private schools. Indeed, this pluralism on the supply side 
seems to have contributed to greater variation in terms of curriculums and teaching 
methods (Hannum, 1999). Many observers seem to agree that the most pressing tasks 
today are instead to expand the number of students in secondary and tertiary education, to 
improve the quality of education at all levels, and to reduce the financial burden of 
schooling for low-income parents.
25 Certainly, these improvements cannot be achieved 
without increased resources to education from the central government, including grants to 
local governments in poor areas of the country.  
 
China also has to deal with a number of well-known organizational problems. One is to 
decide the number of years students should follow a single track and when (and how) 
students should be separated according to interest and ability (dual or multiple tracks). 
Another problem is the trade-off between “basic skills” (reading, writing and arithmetic) 
and broader, more vague “social abilities” (including preparation for civic duties and 
leisure activities). A third-trade off is between theoretical skills and vocational skills. 
 
In all these dimensions, it is probably a good idea to avoid extreme solutions. There is 
rather general agreement among specialists in education that early separation of 
schoolchildren (as, for instance, in Germany) into different tracks (in some countries as 
early as the fifth grade) disfavors children from homes without an academic background. 
Other countries have instead chosen a single-track system that extends through the ninth 
grade or even further, thereby emphasizing theoretical training that prepares a large share 
of a cohort of youngsters (one-third or even half) for university studies. While problems 
                                                 
25 Out-of-pocket expenses on education seem to have increased from about 2 to 13 percent of total 
spending in this sector during the 1990s (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005) – largely to finance tuition fees,   25
associated with early separation are then avoided, the highly heterogeneous classes of 
students in the upper grades of the secondary school system have made it necessary to 
limit intellectual ambitions in theoretical education. At the same time, students who are 
better fitted for, and show more interest in vocational (rather than academic) training often 
have difficulties following such a highly theoretical education, with a large drop-out rate 
as a result. Moreover, several countries that have emphasized general “social abilities” 
rather than “basic skills” (ability to read, write and count) now seem to regret having done 
so. It is also interesting to note that many of today’s rich countries did emphasize “basic 
skills” when they were poor 50 or 100 years ago.  
 
Most countries also have serious problems with their systems of vocational training. 
China is, I believe, well advised to take inspiration from the German experience with 
apprenticeship work at firms, combined with general education in school (i.e., two days a 
week in school and three on the job, or the reverse). This could be accomplished without 
very early separation of students into a two-track system (as in Germany). Vocational 
training in China today is divided among SOEs, training centers affiliated with such firms, 
as well as schools affiliated with the Ministry of Education (MOE) and, to some extent, 
with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS).
26 However, there seem to be 
huge variations in the quality of this training.
27 Deficiencies in quality in many places 




From a social point of view, many observers regard health-care reforms as even more 
urgent than educational reform, in particular for the rural population. An important 
background factor is the abolishment of health services previously provided by 
agricultural communes and “barefoot doctors”. As a result of the stagnation of public-
sector and collective health services during the reform period – indeed a regress for large 
parts of the population in many rural areas – the private sector has taken over the 
                                                                                                                                               
school books, transportation and school uniforms. To this figure should be added unrecorded spending 
on extra education outside the ordinary school day. 
26 See, for instance, Fleisher and Wang (2001) and Li (2004).  
27 For instance, Li (2004) reports many examples of poor supervision, considerable disorder and inefficiencies, 
as well as large mismatches between the demand for skills and the availability of training opportunities for 
different types of skills. The number of vocational schools has also fallen gradually – by at least 50 percent 
since the early 1990s.  
28 In a sample used by Li (2004), about a third of the individuals engaged in vocational training 
participated in programs financed mainly by out-of-pocket money.   26
responsibility for about a third of the production of such services (Kin et al., 2002), 
although some assets (medical facilities) are still owned by public-sector authorities, and 
rented to private agents. As in the case of education, the shift to private producers is not 
necessarily problematical, perhaps even the opposite.
29 The real problem is rather that the 
public sector has reduced, and decentralized, its responsibility for the financing of these 
services. Among the entire population, only about 105 million individuals seem to be 
covered by comprehensive “basic” health-care insurance (China Compendium, 2005. 
However, a modest cooperative system of such insurance is currently being set up in rural 
areas. 
 
Although serious deficiencies are often reported in the provision of health services, health 
spending seems to amount to as much as 5.3 percent of GDP.
30 This observation suggests 
that there may be serious inefficiencies in the provision of such services. One indication is 
that about 68 percent of government funding is reported to be allotted to hospitals rather 
than to health clinics and preventive health services, in spite of the fact that many experts 
regard the latter activities as potentially more important (on the margin) for overall health 
conditions (UNDP, 2005, p. 3).
31 Indeed, about 80 percent of health spending in recent 
years seems to have been concentrated to large and medium-sized cities (Chow, 2006b; 
UNDP 2000, p. 3). These allocations and distributions of health care cannot possibly 
reflect the need for such services in the country as a whole. Clearly, a considerably 
improved health-care situation in China requires both a shift of resources to rural areas 
and a drastic reduction in the financial burden of households, in particular among the 
poor.   
 
As in all countries where a “third party pays”, there are also problems of moral hazard in 
the health-care sector, including excessive medical examinations in many cases – 
demanded by patients or suggested by physicians; see, for instance, Chow (2006b). A 
more specific moral hazard problem in China is that strict price controls on many types of 
                                                 
29 The diversity of providers of education also seems to have contributed to diversity of content and 
teaching methods in the country (Hannum, 1999). 
30 This seems to be some 2-3 percentage points higher than in countries with a similar level of per capita 
income in Southeast Asia (except for Vietnam). 
31 Of China’s total health expenditure (in 2002), 50 percent is reported to have been allotted to urban hospitals, 
and only 7 percent to health centers. It also appears that as little as 7 percent was devoted to “public health” 
(preventive health care) in spite of the fact that such treatment is particularly important in poor countries 
(UNDP, 2005, p. 58).    27
health services have induced hospitals and health clinics to finance much of their health-
care provision by revenues from the sale of drugs (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997). This, in turn, 
has created strong incentives to charge high prices for drugs and to over-prescribe drug 
medication
32. Thus, a more symmetric price system for drugs and other types of treatment 
is likely to improve the allocative efficiency of the health-care sector. 
 
In fact, health-care reforms have recently been announced by the authorities, and such 
reforms are to some extent underway.  As in the case of pensions, the financing of future 
health-care insurance in urban areas is supposed to rely on a combination of paygo 
financing and funding (with individual accounts), the latter organized along similar lines 
as in Singapore and Malaysia.
33 Presumably, individual accounts are particularly useful 
for relatively inexpensive, mainly “out-patient” treatment, rather than expensive 
treatment. Costly treatment (including “catastrophic health care”) is then supposed to be 
covered by the paygo (“risk pooling”) part of the system. However, the individual 
accounts already seem to have run into financial difficulties (similar to those in the 
pension system), thereby forcing the government to inject new money from the general 
budget into the paygo part of the system.
34 The state also encourages enterprises to 
establish supplementary medical insurance for their employees, mainly to settle medical 
expenses not covered by mandatory medical insurance.  
 
Moreover, as in the case of education, a number of well-known trade-offs have to be 
addressed. I refer, in particular, to the trade-offs between preventive and curative care, 
and between basic (relatively inexpensive) and more sophisticated (relatively expensive) 
health care. As for developing countries in general, both ethical and efficiency concerns 
make a case for preventive health services and basic curative health services for broad 
population groups rather than sophisticated (specialized) curative health care for a 
minority of the population. This would be expected to contribute to both broad 
                                                 
32 According to Blumenthal and Hsiao ( 2005), as much as half of total spending on health care consists 
of costs for drugs, while more normal figures in developed countries are usually 10-15 percent.  
33 An individual’s entire contribution (two percent of earnings) and a third of the contribution covered by 
the employer (six percent of the wage bill) are supposed to be paid into the individual’s (funded) 
personal account, while the remaining two thirds of the employer’s premium is allotted to the paygo part 
of the system (i. e., the common “health insurance pool”). See, for instance, Social Insurance Research 
Team (2003). 
34 The payroll tax that finances health insurance is currently 8 percent of the wage rate (OECD, 2005, 
Table 4:3). Social Policy Research Centre (2002, p. 9) estimates that this figure would have to be 
considerably higher than 10 percent in the future to avoid deficits.    28
improvement in the quality of life and higher labor productivity among poor segments of 
the population.   
 
Whereas preventive health care in developed countries is mainly an issue of individuals’ 
life style (smoking habits, diet, exercise, etc.), in poor countries it is also a matter of 
sufficient nutrition, sanitation and efforts to combat transmitted diseases. Not least in 
China, it is also an issue of exceptionally serious pollution. Indeed, some research 
indicates that China’s air pollution problems are among the most damaging in the world. 
The severe environmental problems are, of course, partly side effects of China’s one-sided 
emphasis on capital-intensive, raw material-intensive and energy-intensive industry – 
another illustration of the interaction between growth strategy and social concern. These 
problems are also a result of the limited priority assigned to environmental protection as 
compared with production of goods and services – a historical parallel to similar neglect 
during the early phase of industrialization in today’s developed countries. Although the 
costs of substantially reducing pollution would be considerable, so would the gains in 
terms of improved health (Brajer and Mead, 2004). This would also apply to policy 
interventions requiring firms to improve working conditions. 
 
The Chinese authorities have recently tried to deal with pollution by quantitative 
regulations and graduated charges when emissions exceed certain mandated ceilings. But 
many SOEs do not seem to be particularly sensitive to such charges, simply because profit 
considerations do not dominate their objectives. (This resembles the insensitivity of state 
firms to monetary and fiscal incentives in the context of stabilization policy.) There have 
been recent experiments (conducted in cooperation with the World Bank) to exert social 
pressure on firms, rather than simply relying on quantitative restrictions and economic 
incentives.
35 In other words, as a complement to the latter types of policy measures, the 
idea seems to be that firms’ pollution behavior could be influenced by social norms, 
which are supposed to be upheld by the general public’s through its approval or 
disapproval of firms’ behavior. In the future, when most firms in China are likely to be 
profit-oriented, it will be easier to pursue successful incentive-based policies to improve 
both the environment and working conditions by way of Pigouvian tax/subsidy programs, 
such as fees on polluters and experience-rated fees in the work-injury insurance system.   29
 
In spite of the modest ambitions of social and environmental policies in China during the 
period of economic reforms, life expectancy is rather high as compared to other countries 
with about the same per capita GDP. The level of adult literacy is also relatively high. 
Indeed, according to several cross-country evaluations, China ranks higher in terms of 
such “social” (or “human”) variables than in terms of per capita GDP – in spite of the 
rather low priority given to social and environmental issues during the reform period.
36 
There are at least two ways of explaining this apparent paradox.
37 One could be that high 
life expectancy and widespread adult literacy have to a considerable extent been 
“inherited” from the pre-reform period, when widely distributed, although quite simple, 
health care and basic education were emphasized. As regards health, another explanation 
could be that China – more than other countries with a similar GDP per capita – has a 
long history (after World War II) of promoting widespread sanitation and nutrition for the 
population as a whole – factors that, on the margin, may have been more decisive for life 
expectancy than health care.
38 Moreover, serious health effects of environmental damage 
may only emerge after rather long time lags (several decades).  
 
A more general problem concerning the provision of human services is related to 
difficulties in providing effective mechanisms for adjusting quantities and qualities of 
human services to consumers’ needs and preferences. In particular, in countries where 
local governments have a monopoly on the provision of human services, the “exit option” 
is not available as a means for consumers to exert such influence (except possibly when 
moving to another municipality). The “voice option”, exerted via the political system, is 
necessarily also rather weak in most countries. Citizens’ political influence basically 
                                                                                                                                               
35 One attempted method is to rank firms (publicly) according to their degree of environmental concern – 
the so-called “Green Watch Program” (Wang et al., 2004). 
36 For instance, while China was ranked as country number 96 in terms of GDP per capita (measured on 
a PPP basis) in 2003, it was ranked as number 85 in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which is based on a number of broad economic and social indicators (UNDP, 2005, p. 81).  
In another study, the China Center for Modernization Research (2005) concludes that China is in about 
the same position in terms of “economic modernization” as the most modern countries today were 100 
years ago, while the lag is 80 years in terms of “social modernization”. While economic modernization 
is measured by variables such as GDP per capita, the share of the farming population and the share of 
GDP produced in agriculture, human modernization is measured by health variables, such as average life 
expectancy, and basic education variables, such as adult literacy rates.  
37 Nichlas Lardy brought this apparent paradox to my attention. 
38 However, during the Mao period, the authorities were also responsible for the devastating famine in 
connection with the “Great Leap Forward” in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the huge educational regress 
during the “Cultural Revolution” in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
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refers to the “policy packages” offered by politicians, rather than to specific services 
and/or service providers. Naturally, the voice option would be expected to be especially 
weak in countries without free media and contestable elections. To strengthen the voice 
option at the local administrative level, China has recently introduced elections of village 
leaders in some parts of the country (and in a few townships). There is some evidence that 
this reform has heightened the responsiveness of local authorities to the demands of 
public goods by citizens’ demand for public goods (Luo et al., 2006). But the extent to 
which such reforms will actually strengthen citizens’ influence on the provision of human 
services is limited since there are no competing political parties and centrally appointed 
party officials (party secretaries) still have strong political power over local 
administrations. 
 
Broad trade-offs in social policies 
Future social policies in China cannot avoid delicate trade-offs between further 
improvements in the social arrangements for a minority or urban insiders and modest 
social arrangements for broad population groups. Ethical and possibly also efficiency 
considerations suggest priority for the second alternative. Nevertheless, the minority of 
urban insiders in China have already been favored in this sphere. Most likely, this reflects 
the distribution of political powers in Chinese society. However, the risks of increased 
social unrest among disfavored population groups – rural residents as well as the “floating 
population” – could possibly generate a shift of relative political powers in the future. I 
refer, in particular, to considerable and recently growing social unrest outside of the large 
cities, although this unrest may partly be the result of circumstances other than 
unsatisfactory income security and unaffordable human services.
39 
  
Is there also an unavoidable trade-off between social and economic ambitions? This 
depends partly on the methods applied to pursue social objectives. For instance, such 
trade-offs might be avoided altogether, to the extent that the earnings of low-income 
groups are boosted through policies that raise their productivity and hence factor income – 
rather than through policies that create wide tax/benefit wedges between factor income 
and disposable income. Indeed, under the first mentioned policy strategy, redistributions 
                                                 
39 China Daily reported about 80,000 “social incidents” during 2005.   31
to low-income groups and increased economic efficiency might be brought about 
simultaneously.  
  
Since tax-transfer programs, including mandatory income insurance, are bound to be an 
important component of welfare-state arrangements, disincentive effects are, in fact, 
impossible to avoid. But tax wedges can be limited by tight links between contributions 
and benefits for the individual – as in so-called “quasi-actuarial” income insurance. The 
drawback is that the tighter the links, the smaller the possibilities to use income insurance 
as a method to redistribute ex ante lifetime income.  
 
A realistic analysis of incentive problems of welfare-state arrangements also requires 
concern for moral hazard, which is unavoidable in social insurance. I refer, in particular, 
to situations where individuals exploit such systems to obtain more leisure at the expense 
of the after-tax income of others. In developed countries in Western Europe, the problem 
seems to be particularly severe in the case of unemployment benefits, sickpay, and early 
retirement benefits. Today, about 20 percent of the population of working age in Western 
Europe lives on various types of welfare-state benefits. The problem is accentuated if 
individuals gradually develop a more “liberal” interpretation of their right to live on 
various types of benefits from the government, rather than on work, i.e., if attitudes and 
social norms in favor of work, or against living off government benefits, are weakened. 
Outright benefit cheating is an extreme case. I have hypothesized elsewhere that 
contemporary welfare-state problems in developed countries are partly due to such 
changes in attitudes and social norms (Lindbeck, 1995; Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 
1999). If welfare-state arrangements gradually become encompassing and more generous 
in China, the country will hardly be immune to disincentive effects – through tax wedges, 
moral hazard and induced changes in social norms. Of course, such effects should then be 
compared with the gains in terms of income security and redistribution, and possibly also 
greater social stability in society at large. This point reflects the traditional observation 
that social-security arrangements cannot avoid a trade-off between insurance and 
redistribution, on one hand, and moral hazard and tax distortions on the other. 
 
Another lesson from welfare-state arrangements in developed countries is the importance 
of making social insurance financially robust to “unfavorable” shocks, for instance, in 
demography, productivity growth and macroeconomic development. One way of   32
achieving this is to ensure that the contributions and/or benefits are automatically 
contingent on the development of variables such as the number of individuals above 
retirement age, the rate of growth of the aggregate wage sum (and hence the tax base), and 
the number of individuals of working age living on various types of benefit systems 
(Lindbeck, 2006a). A main advantage would be that politicians could then be relieved of 
the task of making recurrent, unpopular reductions in the generosity of the rules for 
various social arrangements in response to financing problems. Measures to provide such 
arrangements with financial stability would be taken routinely by administrative 
authorities according to rules predetermined by politicians, i.e., through administrative 
delegation. 
  
Lessons such as these from developed countries may seem self-evident, but experience 
has shown that they are not easily learned, and even less easily adopted. Indeed, it has 
turned out to be politically difficult to avoid creating “over-generous” welfare-state 
arrangements in the first place (“overshooting”), as well as to reducing their generosity 
after serious problems have actually been identified by experts and politicians. It is 
imperative for China to watch out for such problems in the future. It is also worth noting 
that in their early phases of economic development, today’s developed countries relied 
mainly on (modest) safety nets, often in the form of lump-sum benefits – rather than on 
arrangements for income protection (i.e., benefits in some proportion to previous 
earnings). It was only after these countries had become rather well off, mainly after World 
War II, that comprehensive and generous arrangements for income protection in the form 
of social insurance became common.
40 Thus, both recent and previous experiences in 
developed countries are well worth considering by the Chinese authorities when traveling 
the route to more ambitious social arrangements. 
 
                                                 
40 Germany under Bismarck introduced social insurance for industrial workers earlier than other 
countries, and the United States built up universal social security, mainly in the form of old-age 
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